PETRA SAWAYA
United Arab Emirates
The Paradox of Democracy
Writing in The Social Contract, one of the most renowned works of political philosophy, Rousseau cautioned that “as soon as any man says of the affairs of the State, ‘What does it matter to me?’ the State may be given up for lost.”1 Surely Rousseau would have been saddened to see the state of the world today. As resentment, apathy and overall disillusionment with political institutions have risen all over the world, voter turnout has decreased globally by around 10% in the past 15 years alone.2 Popular sovereignty now depends, in most places, on the choices of a fraction of citizens. It is unclear how, if at all, this situation still represents the ‘general will of the people’ that gives governments authority.
In an effort to retain the democratic mandate, some countries have introduced mandatory voting, whereby repercussions such as fines or restrictions on access to public services are imposed on those who do not vote. Currently, 21 countries have adopted such policies, with only 10 actively enforcing them.3 They argue that these laws restore legitimacy and equality to their political authorities. Before assessing the effects of these policies, however, a deeper question arises: can we say their spirit is truly democratic? Can freedom be forced upon people? Although compulsory voting may increase turnout and ostensibly strengthen legitimacy, this essay argues that it undermines the purpose of a democratic society by coercing participation, failing to ensure meaningful engagement, and relying on contradictory assumptions about the decisions and rationality of voters.
There are different reasons why people may choose not to vote. Ultimately, it occurs because the costs for them outweigh the benefits. Sometimes these costs can be physical barriers, like transport. For example, in the USA, the 2020 Survey of the Performance of American Elections found that 5.4% of non-voters nationwide cited transportation issues as their main reason for not voting.4 More commonly, the costs are less tangible. This process is highlighted by Anthony Downs in An Economic Theory of Democracy, where he argues that it is rational for voters to remain uninformed and not vote in elections. Seeing as an individual vote has a near-zero probability of changing the outcome of an election, which is the potential benefit, compared to the relatively large cognitive effort it takes to become informed, he concludes it is a perfectly rational choice for most not to vote.5 When introducing a (usually monetary) penalty for non-voters, the cost of not voting increases, effectively increasing the relative benefit of voting. Conducting a new cost-benefit analysis results in the rational choice now being to vote.
Rarely do people disagree with the notion that compulsory voting succeeds in increasing turnout. Perhaps the most famous example of a country with compulsory voting is Australia, which fully enacted the policy in 19846 and enjoys an average turnout of 92%.7 Higher turnout is widely seen as producing a stronger democratic mandate, because the electoral outcome is based on a larger proportion of citizens. A greater proportion of citizens have consented to the government they are being ruled by. Moreover, when voting is not mandatory, it is usually the most socioeconomically disadvantaged in society that do not vote. Recent analysis by the Pew Research Center found that in the 2024 US presidential election, the groups with the highest turnout were white voters, affluent voters, older voters, and voters with higher levels of formal education.8 This doesn’t necessarily mean other groups are more politically apathetic; rather, they face serious issues such as alienation, lack of representation, and an overall disillusionment with the political system. They may feel that they are not taken seriously by the political system. There may be no representative who reflects their interests, values, or social position. Ultimately, politics itself appears not to work for them. This effect then compounds upon itself. The low turnout causes politicians to be less interested in promoting the issues that affect these populations, causing further disinterest in voting, and so it goes on. Mandatory voting would force politicians to appeal to a broader population and advocate for the wellbeing of all their constituents when campaigning. Ultimately, like taxation, jury duty, and other aspects of civic life, voting requires participation to function as intended.
Yet the crucial question remains: does this forced participation lead to a better democracy? There is no evidence proving that mandatory voting leads to better political education amongst the populace. A study done in Argentina, another country that punishes non-voters with fines, found that compulsory voting did not change the way voters chose between politicians. There was no increase in ‘sophisticated’ analysis, meaning using metrics like a candidate’s policy positions to decide who to vote for.9 Another study found that while compulsory voting was useful in increasing turnout, there was no evidence to show it made citizens more interested in politics or made them feel as if they influenced political outcomes.10 Furthermore, there is evidence that compulsory voting leads to a higher rate of invalid ballots being cast. In Australia, the House of Representatives elections occurring directly before and after mandatory voting was implemented for all citizens saw a 200% increase in the number of invalid ballots cast.11 A cross-national meta-analysis of 54 studies done on invalid voting found that the largest precursor to this phenomenon was the introduction of mandatory voting.12 In this sense, compulsory voting appears to induce participation in form rather than substance.
At almost every stage in the chain of reasoning behind mandatory voting, an assumption is made: that people voting are rational beings capable of making the best decisions for themselves, and as a result, their country. When introducing a fine, or some other form of punishment, for non-voters, we expect that they will carry out a cost/benefit analysis and come to the rational conclusion that voting is now the most efficient option for them. When they ultimately go to cast their vote, we expect them to make a rational choice of the one that aligns most closely with their viewpoints. Beforehand, we expect they will have done the necessary research to educate themselves on these candidates, like any rational person would.
Yet, when we first introduce the policy of mandatory voting, it is to correct what we perceive as an irrational decision - that not to vote. We consider these non-voters too lazy, selfish or otherwise foolish to understand the harm they are doing in illegitimising the government. How is it that these same individuals, once compelled to vote, will suddenly become paragons of logic? Here we find Schrodinger’s voter; irrational when they abstain, and suddenly rational once more when they choose to participate. When they do not vote, we assume they are failing to act in their own self-interest. Yet studies have shown there is little evidence that increased vote share from a disadvantaged group will incentivise political parties to advocate for them.13 When they do vote, however, we hope these same people will not only act in their own self-interest, but will also gain the motivation to politically inform themselves and cast a valid ballot. As previously covered in this essay, these hopes often fail to materialise, because most non-voters are not just excessively indolent and instead feel deeply alienated from politics as a whole.
Declining turnout is certainly a legitimate concern for all those invested in the future of democracy. But efforts would be better focused on lowering barriers to entry for voting, like easier registration and more accessible voting systems; or on improving political engagement, possibly through civic education and better information access. We need to treat the cause of the political apathy that plagues so many voters of today, not the symptom. If we are to stay democratic, we must have faith in the ordinary people that democracy rests upon. Either we trust they know what is best for themselves, or we abandon this system of government altogether - for if the goal of democracy is to secure our freedom, it cannot begin by compelling it.
Citations:
1: Rousseau, J.-J. (1762). The Social Contract. [online] Cambridge University Press, p.49. Available at: https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/rousseau1762.pdf.
2: International IDEA (2026). Voter Turnout Database | International IDEA. [online] www.idea.int. Available at: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout-database.
3: CIA (2026). Suffrage - The World Factbook. [online] Archive.org. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20260104011032/https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/suffrage/.
4: Voon, S.K.W. and Voon, J.P. (2026). How Does Public Transit Connectivity Affect Voter Turnout? The Case of US. Economics, Politics and Regional Development, 7(1), p.p1. doi:https://doi.org/10.22158/eprd.v7n1p1.
5: Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
6: Evans, T. (2011). Compulsory voting in Australia. [online] Australian Electoral Commission. Available at: https://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/Publications/voting/index.htm.
7: ElectionGuide (n.d.). IFES Election Guide | Country Profile: Australia. [online] www.electionguide.org. Available at: https://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/14/.
8: Pew Research Center (2025). 1. Voter turnout, 2020-2024. [online] Pew Research Center. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2025/06/26/voter-turnout-2020-2024/.
9: Singh, S.P. (2022). Does Compulsory Voting Affect How Voters Choose? A Test Using a Combined Conjoint and Regression Discontinuity Analysis. Comparative Political Studies, 118, p.001041402110662. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140211066219.
10: Engelen, B. and Hooghe, M. (2007). Compulsory voting and its effects on political participation, interest and efficacy. Lirias (KU Leuven).
11: Australian Electoral Commission (n.d.). Informality (%) House of Representatives and Senate. [online] Australian Electoral Commission. Available at: https://www.aec.gov.au/Voting/Informal_Voting/summary.htm.
12: Kouba, K. and Lysek, J. (2018). What Affects Invalid Voting? A Review and Meta-Analysis. Government and Opposition, 54(4), pp.1–31. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2018.33.
13: Hoffman, M., León, G. and Lombardi, M. (2017). Compulsory voting, turnout, and government spending: Evidence from Austria. Journal of Public Economics, 145, pp.103–115. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.10.002.
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