Star-Bound: The Pace and Regulation of Innovation

“T-plus” four minutes after takeoff, a fireball engulfed the camera-feed millions across the world were watching. The SpaceX Starship exploded spectacularly; $90 million of debris plummeted back to Earth.22 Despite being the fifth prototype rocket destroyed in nearly three years, the April 2023 explosion was taken in stride by SpaceX CEO Elon Musk, who experienced another setback when a sixth prototype combusted that November.8 While financially destructive, rocket failures of this type are merely part of the “move fast and break things” corporate philosophy adopted from big tech and employed by the world’s preeminent private space companies: Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic, and, as mentioned, SpaceX.10 However, just as Facebook forayed into the digital landscape with little consideration of its ability to upend lives and destabilize regions, so have private space companies thrust themselves into rapid innovation with little regard for how their “broken things” affect the world.18, 23 Supporting these trial-and-error practices are lucrative contracts with both private and public entities as well as multi-million investments from firms recognizing the value innovative, reusable rocket technology promises for mankind.13, 15 Direct contrasts to the recent growth of private space are traditional, governmental aeronautical agencies which are beholden to the funding allocated by politicians and their constituents. Considering the ease of obtaining capital, private space companies are best at innovative, cost-effective manufacturing and expedient testing. However, corporate tendencies to innovate recklessly while neglecting safety and prioritizing profits are best challenged with regulation by international and governmental agencies - organizations representing the people - who can regulate private space entities, cooperate with them, and set humanity’s goals for space exploration.

While the private space industry has received increasing media attention in recent years, the concept is far from new. In the 1960s, aerospace companies such as North American Rockwell, Boeing, and McDonald Douglas were instrumental in designing and constructing Saturn V – the rocket used during humanity’s first trip to the Moon.20 In these formative years, companies were contracted to supply individual parts to larger, government-led projects. Today, legislation and waves of investment afford private space companies far greater autonomy than their predecessors.26 This has manifested rapid innovation in both design and practice, exemplified by the adoption of “platform systems.” With a substantial initial investment, a platform of repeatable, smaller projects based upon iterable sub-systems continually builds to a greater goal.1 As a result, SpaceX operates ten times cheaper and two times faster than NASA using this system.1 Under bureaucratic weight, governmental bodies have been slow to adopt the private industry's innovative practices, instead choosing the traditional "bespoke model" in which all effort is directed at a single audacious leap in technology.1 The agility of the private sector’s approach allows them to conduct missions in record times and for record low costs, encouraging international bodies to contract out the launching of satellites, resupplying of space stations, and possibly soon, the arrival of humans to the Moon and Mars. Charles Bolden, a former NASA Administrator, acknowledged the innovation advantage private space companies held, referencing SpaceX’s ability to conduct rapid testing: “If we lost rockets at the rate that Elon Musk loses his big Starship, NASA would’ve been out of business. Congress would have shut us down” (Charles Bolden, ABC News).11

Complementing the financial advantages and efficiency the platform system provides is the budgetary predictability it offers. Of 16 SpaceX missions, only 50% were over budget by an average overrun of 1.1%; comparatively, over 118 NASA missions, 90% were over budget by an average overrun of 90%.1 What accounts for this stark difference in budget overrun? It is the bold leaps by which NASA operates; these often fail or don’t account for issues that may arise between contractors and the agency. The Mars Observer is a prime example of grand failure. The spacecraft, costing $1.3 billion (in 2000 dollars) and 17 years to develop, lost connection days before entering orbit – the entire project was scrapped thereafter. The Space Shuttle program, although successful, ended in 2011 after its “bespoke design” was unable to be improved. NASA invested over $221 billion (in 2012 dollars) into the Shuttle program; its cancellation left a significant portion of that investment irrelevant to NASA’s contemporary projects.1 This unpredictable waste contributes to NASA’s budgetary fluxes; in contrast, SpaceX utilizes smaller, iterable projects. These preserve the research and development of previous missions and, as such, issues that may arise in new projects are easier to predict, thus making the company more reliable and dependable. It is clear the financial and innovation advantages private space companies enjoy over their governmental and international counterparts; however, all-too Earthly tendencies to descend into complacency and neglect safety present challenges for future space exploration. 

It is now “T-plus” five minutes after takeoff and debris from the Starship prototype rains down across a six-mile stretch of Boca Chica, Texas. In their investigation of the April 2023 explosion, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service reported that “large concrete chunks, stainless steel sheets, metal and other objects” landed within the Lower Rio Grande National Wildlife Refuge, a protected land home to the endangered piping plover and the critically endangered Kemp's ridley sea turtle, whose mating season runs through April.5, 14 A parallel investigation by the Federal Aviation Administration found sixty “corrective measures” SpaceX needed to implement to mitigate future failure and damage.16 After the sixth prototype exploded in November, environmental groups initiated new suits against the FAA, claiming they were negligent in assessing the potential ecological damage of SpaceX’s rocket failures. While reports indicate no wildlife was injured from the debris and these explosions are relatively rare, private spaces’ tolerance for environmental damage signals neglect of present public duties in their unbridled pursuit of the future. 

As the industry has been derelict in its duties, they have also continually abused its workforce, threatening lives and product safety. At SpaceX, over 600 injury incidents are documented - the majority resulting from lax safety protocols.24 In one incident, a part blown off a rocket during pressure testing fractured the skull of an employee, putting him in a coma. The issue was discovered earlier, yet it remained unresolved until after the injury. In a separate incident, an employee was encouraged to lay over insulation in transit for lack of a securing strap. He was jettisoned from the transporter by a gust of wind and landed on his head – he later died from the injury.24 At the risk of falling behind the schedule of innovation, SpaceX management perpetuates a work culture in which the individual is disposable in the pursuit of progress. “The company justifies casting aside anything that could stand in the way of accomplishing that goal, including worker safety,” (Reuters) remarked one disgruntled employee. Blue Origin, owned by Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, has also faced similar safety concerns. In an open letter directed at the FAA, twenty-one Blue Origin employees claimed the rockets were unsafe, citing concerns that over 1000 documented issues were not being addressed. Reportedly, upper management strongly suppressed dissent, stating that employees lacked “high-enough risk tolerance."17 

Despite the industry’s dangerous practices, one may ask: Is this not the price of innovation? No, under current workplace cultures, the pace the industry pursues cuts all possible corners. In space, cutting corners results in fatalities. The factory employees do not work assuming the risk of death, they work in assumed safety to make mankind star-bound. Accepting danger as necessary for progress enables corporations to treat space not as humanity’s destiny, but as a vehicle to exploit those on Earth. International and governmental agencies are not perfect – they never have been – but they are scrutinously regulated by cautious governments, ensuring a certain level of safety is met if they wish to continue receiving taxpayer funding. For example, after the fatal 2003 Columbia disaster, NASA postponed launches for two years to undergo an internal reassessment – implementing crucial safety standards which led to the retirement of the aging Shuttle program.9 

Recently, NASA Administrator Bill Nelson and European Space Agency Director Joesf Aschbacher made their agencies’ positions on privatization clear: Humanity is turning to the stars in both international and commercial capacities.6 However, the question remains – how should these two systems coexist and cooperate? First, it is imperative that to advance scientific understanding, international, research-motivated organizations must establish humanity's goals. Profit-motivated companies are best suited for cost-effective manufacturing to fulfill these goals. Additionally, to satiate the industry's appetite, private companies should continue to seek profits in launching satellites and resupplying space stations for both sectors. However, as industry races to the bottom, international groups must step in to ensure the pace of innovation does not harm the environment nor sacrifice human life. In the push for our next breakthrough discovery, humanity’s next celestial voyage, each half of the two space systems must contribute their best – working with the “opposing” system to find a solution that benefits the human race. With convivial cooperation between private and public, it is certain that humanity is headed in only one direction – up!

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